Taiwan as an essential element of Beijing’s strategy. The credible threat of military force
must complement political, economic, and cultural coercion for the entire strategy to
succeed. However much China does not wis h to attack Taiwan, it needs to be prepared to
do so for the nonmilitary components of its strategy to be sufficiently persuasive.
China’s military options take into account its resource challenges and Taiwan’s
comparative weaknesses.
Taiwan Vulnerabilities
Status of the Taiwan Military
Taipei’s virtual diplomatic isolation since the late 1970s has isolated it from many global
advances in military professionalism and technology. Its military remains largely a
ground force, with the Taiwan Army dominating the Taiwan Navy and Air Force by an
approximate 2:1:1 ratio, respectively. Con????s serving for less than 2 years fill most of
the military’s 385,000 billets. Lack of professional noncommissioned officers
overburdens commissioned officers, and a “joint” warfighting culture in which the
individual services would complement each other is still evolving.
Despite PLA emphasis on modernizing air, naval, and missile capabilities, the Taiwan
Army retains its historic focus on counterlanding operations and has major shortcomings
in training and reservist mobilization. Organizationally well run, the Navy benefits from
modern destroyer and submarine acquisitions, but Navy operations are not well integrated
with those of the Army or Air Force, and multi-mission training is infrequent. The Air
Force’s recently completed transition from 1960s fighter aircraft to modern “fourthgeneration”
units retains many of its qualitative advantages over the PLAAF. However,
fighter pilot shortages are stressing personnel, and training is conservative and
overemphasizes defensive counter-air missions.
Taipei is making a concerted effort to address its military shortfalls. Force streamlining
programs under way since 1997 are combining redundant institutions and steadily
reducing the military to 270,000 personnel by 2012. As the size of the force declines,
Taipei intends to gradually expand the number of volunteer soldiers. Two defense reform
laws implemented in 2002 for the first time granted the civilian defense minister control
over the entire military and expanded legislative oversight authority. Acquisitions in the
next several years will emphasize modern C4ISR equipment that will vastly improve
communications and data-sharing among services. These and other planned acquisitions
will gradually shift the island’s strategic emphasis to offshore engagement of invading
Chinese forces.
The principal indicator of Taiwan’s commitment to addressing its shortfalls will be the
fate of its annual defense budget. Defense spending has steadily declined in real terms
over the past decade, even as Chinese air, naval, and missile force modernization has
increased demands for expensive countermeasures that will enable Taiwan to avoid being
quickly overwhelmed by the PLA. Many of the force improvements and equipment
acquisitions Taipei plans to make will require expanded training and more professional
military personnel who will require more procurement and salary funds.
Taiwan’s Will To Fight
Taipei’s military challenges are not lost on Beijing. The island’s apparent lack of
political consensus over addressing them with substantially increased defense spending is
undoubtedly seen as an encouraging trend in Beijing. If successful, PLA modernization
will threaten that Taiwan autonomy by enabling Beijing to launch a devastating standoff
attack with insufficient warning time for foreign forces to mobilize and deploy to aid
Taiwan. Taiwan’s declining defense spending thus comes at a time when the island’s
need to improve its own deterrent options is apparent.
One possible reason for Taiwan’s attitude toward defense spending might be diverging
perceptions of economic and military trends in the Taiwan Strait. Even as the PLA
steadily fields more ballistic missiles and modern air and nava l systems, Taiwan’s need
for low-wage labor and China’s seeming unlimited need for investment capital and
managerial expertise are concurrently expanding cross-Strait economic interdependence.
The several hundred thousand s of Taiwan’s 23 million residents living and working on
the mainland are a substantial group with a vested interest in avoiding any cross-Strait
tension.
PLA Military Options
The PLA’s offensive capabilities improve each year and provide Beijing with an
increasing number of credible options to intimidate or actually attack Taiwan. China’s
primary goal in acquiring this force most likely is to compel Taipei’s acquiescence to a
negotiated solution by promising swift and effective retaliation if it does not. Such force
therefore would need to be capable of achieving a rapid collapse of Taiwan’s national
will and thereby preclude U.S. intervention. The specific coercive military strategy that
Beijing would adopt is unclear but is likely to include some combination of the options
specified below. A coercive campaign may seek to deter or punish Taiwan through
sudden application of violence. China may choose gradually to escalate the level of
military pressure to compel Taiwan’s political leadership to adopt policies favorable to
Beijing’s interests. On the other hand, Beijing may seek to deny Taiwan’s military its
ability to resist, thereby convincing the leadership to cease resistance. The PLA also
could adopt a decapitation strategy, seeking to neutralize Taiwan’s political and military
leadership on the assumption that their successors would accede to Beijing.
PLA Air Campaign
The PLAAF and PLANAF have a combined total of approximately 3,400 aircraft,
consisting of air defense and multirole fighters, ground-attack fighter-bombers, and
bombers. However, Taiwan maintains a qualitative edge by possessing three times as
many fourth-generation fighters as China. The PLAAF does not appear to have been putting large numbers of aircraft in the air simultaneously, controlling large numbers of
engagements, or sustaining high sortie rates for extended periods. Pilot proficiency is
improving, but the capabilities of China’s best pilots lag behind those of their Taiwan
counterparts.
However, China’s force modernization, weaponry, pilot training, tactics, and command
and control are beginning to erode Taiwan’s qualitative edge. The number of Chinese
fourth-generation fighters, principally Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft, is expected to move
closer to Taiwan’s. China will have improved situational awareness. Beijing’s SRBM
force also could be used to soften Taiwan’s air defenses and disrupt airbase operations,
supporting any air campaign designed to cripple the Taiwan Air Force and damage or
destroy Taiwan military facilities. Over the next several years, given current trends,
China most likely will be able to cause significant damage to all of Taiwan’s airfields and
quickly degrade Taiwan’s ground-based air defenses and associated command and
control through a combination of SRBMs, land-attack cruise missiles, special operations
forces, and other assets.
Conventional Ballistic Missiles
China’s growing force of approximately 500 SRBMs is believed to be based in the Nanjing
Military Region directly opposite Taiwan. From their garrisons, any missiles with adequate
precision guidance could destroy key leadership facilities, military bases, and communication
and transportation nodes with minimal advanced warning. Some can attack U.S. bases on
Okinawa. Longer-range conventional MRBMs are expected ultimately to join the inve ntory.
Naval Blockade
PLAN modernization is expanding options for a naval blockade of Taiwan. The least
hostile blockade option would be one enforced in the South and East China Seas that
compelled Taiwan-bound ships to stop in mainland ports for inspections. The most
effective blockade would involve direct action against major Taiwan ports such as
declaring and enforcing closure areas in port approaches, mining ports and roadsteads,
attacking ships approaching the ports, sinking ships in port channels, or destroying port
facilities.
Information Operations
During a cross-Strait conflict, China most likely would initiate an intensive perception
management campaign, with both global and regional audiences, to reduce the desire of
Taiwan to resist, justify China’s military campaign, and deter U.S. intervention. China
anticipates that this strategy will succeed because of the fragility of the Taiwan
population’s psychology. The Chinese perception management campaign most likely
would use Chinese, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other regional media to deliver messages to
the Taiwan people and leaders. Unclassified Chinese writings reveal that attacking C4I systems, civilian information
technology, and communication infrastructure are critical for gaining information
superiority. Prior to an attack, Chinese information operations personnel and special
forces or espionage agents most likely would gain and maintain access to such
communication nodes for intelligence exploitation and disrupt critical infrastructure, such
as the power grid and vulnerable collocated military and civilian telecommunications.
Exploiting other portions of the information operations spectrum (through electronic
warfare and denial and deception) also could disrupt Taiwan’s defenses, and attacks
against unclassified DoD computer networks related to logistics could delay U.S. efforts to
intervene.
PLA Ground Forces
PLA ground forces have a considerable numerical advantage over Taiwan’s Army and
Marine forces. Three group armies are based in Nanjing Military Region opposite
Taiwan, and several others most likely would be included as part of the primary attack
force in the event of an all-out invasion of the island. Airborne units, special operations
forces, and marine units most likely would support these group armies. Despite its
numerical advantage, China’s main ground forces have shortcomings in such areas as
sealift and logistics. However, China is steadily expanding its ability to transport ground
forces by air.
Special forces could play an important role in achieving objectives in which limited
goals, scale of force, and time would be crucial to victory. Special forces missions could
include reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and battle damage assessments; capturing
or assassinating VIPs; locating or destroying communication assets, transport nodes, and
logistic depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports; supporting invasion forces;
destroying air defense assets; and conducting denial and deception and information
operations.
Amphibious Invasion
If all other military options for subjugating Taiwan failed, Beijing could try to occupy the
entire island of Taiwan. Such an operation would require a major commitment of civilian
air and maritime transport assets, and success would not be guaranteed. The PLA's
success in a D-Day-style invasion of Taiwan would rest on a number of variables, some
tangible -- principally lack of amphibious lift -- as well as a number of intangibles,
including personnel and equipment attrition rates on both sides of the Strait;
interoperability of PLA forces; and the ability of China's logistic system to support the
necessarily high tempo of operations. For an invasion to succeed, Beijing would have to
conduct a multifaceted campaign, involving all of the above options in concert. The PLA
most likely would encounter great difficulty conducting such a sophisticated campaign
throughout the remainder of the decade. Nevertheless, the campaign could succeed --
barring third-party intervention -- if Beijing were willing to accept the political,
economic, diplomatic, and military costs that an invasion would produce. PLA Counters to Foreign Intervention
Beijing sees Washington as the principal hurdle to any attempt to use military force to
regain Taiwan. Therefore, deterring or defeating foreign intervention ahead of Taiwan’s
capitulation or defeat would be integral to Beijing’s strategy.
Antiaccess Strategy
China could consider a sea- denial strategy to hold at risk U.S. naval forces approaching the
Taiwan Strait. Deep-water naval mines, submarines, cruise missiles, and even special
forces could be employed to threaten a U.S. aircraft carrier. This strategy’s tactical
elements might include shallow and deep-water mines, submarines, and surface
combatants. Information operations assets could attack U.S. C4ISR and logistic systems.
Denial and Deception (D&D)
From China’s perspective, denial and deception are interrelated. The goal of D&D is “to
induce the other side to take action that will benefit the deceiver in attaining his goals.”
China uses military D&D to induce an adversary to make incorrect decisions and take
military actions that favor the Chinese. Chinese D&D practices appear to be intended to
delay or reduce U.S. diplomatic and military roles in crises.
Chinese D&D concepts include “counter-surveillance” measures limiting the flow of
intelligence adversaries can gather on China, such as restricting news, isolating
personnel, and blocking core intelligence. “Strategic deception” would interfere with
enemy surveillance. China also could transmit a large volume of false information to
enemy surveillance systems. Moreover, the PLA could attempt to conceal and disguise
the battlefield to “show the false while hiding the true situation.”
Underground Facilities
The Chinese believe they can defeat the U.S. intelligence apparatus by hiding military
activity. China has built civil and military underground facilities for at least four
decades, initially because of fear of a possible war with the former Soviet Union.
Enormous resources were dedicated to building national command posts, civil defense
facilities, and associated communications in defensible nuclear-hardened underground
facilities. Several of these facilities have fallen into disrepair owing to inadequate
maintenance, but China implemented a modernization program in the early 1970s
through the early 1980s.
These complexes and others like them have been expanded recently following the Gulf
War and other U.S. military operations. Chinese exp erts have noted that “long- range air attacks have become an important pattern of modern warfare.” The Chinese believe that
a successful strategic air campaign involves attacks on the defending country over a long
period, with emphasis on C3 centers, missile facilities (ballistic and air defense), airfields,
and transportation hubs. China is implementing these lessons with a program to
camouflage and protect such potential targets by expanding underground facilities.
Operation ALLIED FORCE appears to have had at least as much impact on PLA
thinking as the Gulf War, although more as a validation of earlier assessments of the
trends of modern warfare than as a catalyst for change. PLA commentary on NATO’s
Kosovo air operation concluded that a superior enemy’s situational awareness and
precision-strike systems could be stymied through effective, and often low-technology,
counter-reconnaissance measures, such as camouflage and concealment, simple decoys,
dispersion, and frequent movement of forces. U.S. air operations reinforced the PLA
focus on using underground facilities, landline communications, and well-concealed
supply depots.
A Non-HEMP Unconventional Nuclear Weapon Option
Effects other than high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) result from a high-altitude
nuclear burst, which causes a substantial change in the ionization of the upper
atmosphere, including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects would be likely
to significantly degrade warfighting capabilities, including communication links, radar
transmissions, and the full spectrum of electro-optic sensors. Depending on the weapon
and the altitude of the burst, these effects could persist from seconds to days and extend
over thousands of square kilometers. Russian and U.S. experiences with high- altitude
nuclear weapon effects have been well documented, and a number of papers are in the
public domain and possibly would be known to physicists and engineers worldwide.
Thus, PLA theorists who have become aware of these electromagnetic effects may have
considered using a nuclear weapon as an unconventional attack option. China could use
high-altitude nuclear bursts to disrupt enemy C4ISR. Sophisticated military capabilities
that exploit the full electromagnetic spectrum are more vulnerable to these effects than
are less advanced capabilities. In contrast to HEMP, ionization effects would occur
regardless of the weapon’s design or sophistication. This phenomenon raises the
possibility of an adversary employing an unsophisticated nuclear weapon as an
asymmetric attack option.
Taiwan’s Strengths in Countering PLA Courses of Action
Asymmetric capabilities that Taiwan possesses or is acquiring could deter a Chinese
attack by making it unacceptably costly. Taiwan most likely will expand these
capabilities either in tandem with or in lieu of improving its conventional forces.
Strike Capabilities Against the Mainland
Taipei political and military leaders have recently suggested acquiring weapon systems
capable of standoff strikes against the Chinese mainland as a cost-effective means of deterrence. Taiwan’s Air Force already has a latent capability for airstrikes against
China. Leaders have publicly cited the need for ballistic and land-attack cruise missiles.
Since Taipei cannot match Beijing’s ability to field offensive systems, proponents of
strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible threats to
China’s urban population or high- value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter
Chinese military coercion.
Diplomatic Support
President Chen’s administration has sought to elicit international sympathy for Taiwan’s
plight in the face of China’s growing ballistic missile force, for which the island has no
adequate countermeasures. A diplomatic initiative begun late in 2002 sought to draw
international attention to the growing cross-Strait missile imbalance. A resolution
demanding that China withdraw its missiles from the Taiwan Strait area was initially
selected as the topic for the island’s first popular referendum. Taipei probably hopes
these efforts will deter such an attack by increasing the prospect for diplomatic
consequences.
Computer Network Attack
Taiwan’s limited ability to attack Chinese military bases has prompted some Taiwan
authors to endorse attacking China’s command and control systems to achieve
information superiority. Specific targets would include Chinese airports, command and
control centers, and communication nodes. Taiwan has significant potential in this area,
thanks to the island’s high information technology level and the military’s ability to
con???? personnel from a tech-savvy population.
Psychological Warfare
The Taiwan military’s principal psychological warfare (PSYWAR) organization is the
General Political Warfare Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (MND).
Subordinate units conducting strategic psychological operations include the 1st
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group, three Army PSYOP companies responsible
for publishing and propaganda, and the Political Warfare College, which trains PSYWAR
cadre.
The Army PSYWAR Preparedness Center was set up in January 2002. This center will
carry out future PSYOP missions with the armed forces' first wholly dedicated PSYWAR
units, integrated with combat intelligence. If the PSYWAR Preparedness Center
succeeds, a special command organization will be set up in the MND. Army, Navy, and
Air Force PSYOP units probably will be organized in the future.
Electronic Warfare
EW is a top Taiwan military priority because of concerns about China’s own developing
EW capabilities. During the island’s HANKUANG-19 exercise in 2003, tactical EW units exercised jamming against command and control networks and intelligence
collection systems supporting enemy amphibious landings. Taiwan’s MND
Communications Development Office also reportedly has a strategic EW capability.
Taiwan has more than 30 other ground electronic reconnaissance stations and
communications intelligence stations.
Information Operations
Taiwan’s MND has identified information warfare as a key area for modernization. The
military intends that information operations, along with command and control systems,
will survive an initial PLA assault. Taiwan’s ongoing “Posheng” C4ISR modernization
project includes electronic countermeasure and electronic counter-countermeasure
enhancements. These efforts aim to ensure Taiwan’s C4ISR survives kinetic and
nonkinetic attacks, such as cyberwarfare. In the past 2 years, training exercises worked
to set a firm foundation for information operations capabilities.
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