China’s preference is to develop and produce a weapon system domestically to satisfy a
particular long-term military requirement. To accomplish this, it uses technologies and
commodities from domestic and foreign sources. The second track involves acquiring
advanced foreign weapon systems and technologies to satisfy immediate military
requirements, often also acquiring related manufacturing technologies. This demand for
technology transfer as part of an end- item sale is known as an “offset.” Since at least
1993, China reportedly has acquired advanced Russian weapon technologies for
development of air, ground, and naval weapon systems, as well as adva nced materials
and manufacturing technologies associated with missiles, lasers, and space system
manufacturing. Beijing has expressed interest in or is currently negotiating the purchase
of additional Russian weapon systems and military technology, to inc lude additional
KILO submarines, antisubmarine helicopters, and various aircraft engines. China’s
interest in assembling or producing Russian weapons apparently remains strong.
China and Russia have typically maintained a robust defense and security rela tionship,
including bilateral policy consultations and professional military-to- military intelligence
exchanges. Selling arms and military technology to China is a major component of
Russia's foreign and security policy. Russian conventional weapon technology transfers
will help advance the speed of development and improve the lethality of every major
category of weapon system under development in China. The pace of this technology
transfer continues unabated as China strives for self-sufficiency. Military-technical
cooperation with Beijing acts as a source of revenue to fill state coffers, support defense
industries, and enrich influential Russian individuals and groups. It also provides
Moscow with a vehicle to bolster relations with an emerging power and provides a
primary source of funding for continued Russian military R&D efforts.
Beijing reportedly purchased, on average, some $1.2 billion worth of Russian weapons
each year during the 1990s, accounting for about 30 percent of total Russian arms sales.
However, beginning in 1999, China’s purchases from Russia rose and have averaged
approximately twice that amount annually. Russian leaders are not likely to significantly
reduce their sales effort in China, even under pressure from a third party. Similarly,
improved U.S. - Russian relations after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks are unlikely
to cause Moscow to scale down arms transfers to Beijing.
Because of persistent concerns over the direction of China’s foreign and security policies,
Russia’s leadership has placed some limits on the types and sophistication of weapons
sold to China. However, arms and technology sales also strengthen Russia’s relationship
with China. Access to Russian weapons gives Beijing a strong stake in cooperating with
Moscow. Russian leaders probably view China’s commitment to good relations as
particularly important because of the length of their common border, demographic trends
in Russia’s eastern regions, Beijing’s growing power, and mutual concern over U.S.
policies, in particular the growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia.
Ukraine is a moderate supplier in the world arms market and has active military
cooperation agreements with dozens of nations, including China; however, Kiev’s arms
sales to China make up only a small percentage of its total world sales. Since Ukraine
has no political sanctions against China, no diplomatic barriers prevent growth in military
cooperation agreements or arms sales. Ukraine most likely would resist international
pressure to limit cooperation with China, or it would declare its cooperation but move
some of its sales into the gray market to obscure direct government links.
The Belarusian arms trade is closely tied to that of Russia. Minsk uses arms sales to
generate hard currency and to keep its struggling arms industry afloat. China is a
lucrative target for arms sales, and, since there are no internationally recognized sanctions
against China, Minsk does not perceive a need to limit its sales or military cooperation
with Beijing. Although Belarus is a signatory to major international agreements
regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it does not believe it should be
subject to any constraints on transferring conventional technologies and systems.
Uzbekistan recently joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which
China is a leading member. Despite some concerns over Beijing’s intentions in Central
Asia, Uzbekistan’s bilateral military cooperation with Beijing has increased in recent
years, primarily through professional military exchanges and military assistance.
Available evidence indicates that arms-related sales and technology transfers to China are
limited.
Kazakhstan apparently pursues defense and security contacts with Beijing primarily as a
mechanism to promote economic cooperation and address shared regional security issues,
such as Islamic extremism, border delimitation, and demilitarization. Available
information does not show a significant Kazakh-Chinese military arms relationship. Any
growth in bilateral military cooperation, including arms sales or professional military
exchanges, most likely would reflect a balance of Kazakhstan's interests to support
economic and security cooperation with the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent
States while pursuing closer economic ties and continuing dialogue with China through
the SCO framework.
Although Kyrgyz military contacts with China have increased in recent years, no
available information suggests significant arms transfers to China. Kyrgyzstan has
agreed to headquarter the SCO Counterterrorism Center in Bishkek, indicating that closer
defense and security relations with Beijing most likely will include cooperative measures
to combat Islamic extremism. In late 2002, the PLA and the Kyrgyz military held a joint
exercise on the border to coordinate their counterterrorism efforts.
Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States
Collective Security Pact and the SCO. While Tajikistan faces practical political restraints
on military cooperation with China, it reportedly has begun a program of military-tomilitary
exchanges with Beijing. However, there is no evidence of arms or technology
transfers from Tajikistan to China.
The remaining FSU states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, and Turkmenistan -- are not believed to have a significant defense, security, or
military-technical component to their bilateral relations with China. Implications of a Potential Lifting of the EU Arms Embargo
Efforts underway to lift the European Union (EU) embargo on China will provide
additional opportunities to acquire specific technologies from Western suppliers. In the
near-term, Beijing likely will continue to look to Russia to fulfill its military procurement
goals. Russia most likely will remain the primary supplier of China’s advanced
conventional weapons, with Europe acting as an emerging supplier; however, a more
diverse post-embargo supplier base may enhance China’s leverage in negotiating
purchases of advanced conventional weapons and technology.
IV. FORCE MODERNIZATION
PLA Strategy and Doctrine Influence on China’s Investment in Military
Modernization
China’s military modernization is oriented on developing the capabilities to fight and win
“local wars under modern high- tech conditions.” Based largely on observations of U.S.
and allied operations since Operation DESERT STORM, PLA modernization envisions
seeking precision-strike munitions, modern command and control systems, and state-ofthe-
art ISR platforms. Beijing sees its potential future adversaries, particularly the U.S.
Armed Forces, acquiring these advanced systems, and this is a driver in PLA defensive
and offensive force modernization. In addition, although the PLA views these
components as significant force multipliers, it also sees them as centers of gravity that, if
denied, degraded, or destroyed, could greatly hinder a modern enemy’s capabilities to
wage war.
In this context, the PLA has sought to upgrade key components of its military through
purchases of foreign weapons and domestic development. These efforts have focused
mainly on modern aircraft, ballistic missiles, naval combatants and weapons, advanced
C4ISR systems, and information warfare. Altho ugh Beijing has emphasized these
programs, it faces modernizing a military that comprised mainly older generation
weapons with limited capabilities against a modern adversary. In addition, China faces
challenges in integrating the newly acquired equipment.
PLA Weapon Acquisition Strategy
Air Forces
China continues its force-wide modernization program to improve overall combat
capabilities in the next decade. Beijing continues to acquire advanced aircraft and
weapons, with the goal of improving the abilities of the PLAAF and PLANAF to defend
national airspace from attack and to interdict and strike enemy forces at greater distances
from China’s land and sea borders. China continues to upgrade its air-to-air capabilities with additional Su-27/FLANKER
aircraft produced from licensed Russian kits and Su-30MKK multirole fighter aircraft
purchased directly from Russia. The PLANAF is expected to acquire a naval strike
version of the Su-30 by the end of 2004. China has acquired the AA-12/ADDER activeradar-
guided air-to-air missile from Russia and continues to develop advanced air-to-air
munitions. China flew its domestically developed FC-1 lightweight fighter for the first
time during 2003. Also in development is a domestic advanced fighter, the F-10, which
is to become operational in the next few years. In addition, Beijing has continued to
pursue domestic upgrades to its F-8II fighters. Since China received its first advanced
aircraft in 1992, training, tactics, and operational concepts have progressed slowly. In the
past 3 years, the pace of advanced fighter integration has quickened. Air combat tactics
continue to evolve, and training is becoming more advanced, although it remains behind
Western standards.
With the acquisition of multirole aircraft and advanced munitions, China is beginning to
make significant strides toward improving its maritime and land-attack strike capabilities.
The primary focus is on improving sensors and weapons to increase the survivability and
lethality of attack airframes, allowing them to defend themselves while en route to the
target and to deliver guided munitions once there. The Su-30 aircraft destined for the
PLANAF will be capable of supporting the launch of radar- guided air-to-surface missiles
(ASMs), such as the AS-X-17b/KRYPTON antiship cruise missile. China still is
developing the FB-7, an all-weather, supersonic, medium-range fighter-bomber with an
antiship mission. Improvements to the FB-7 most likely will include a better radar, nightattack
avionics, and more advanced weapons. With development and acquisition of
guided munitions, land-attack capabilities are improving as well; important developments
in this area include antiradiation missiles and laser- and TV-guided ASMs and bombs the
Su-30MKK can deliver.
China has sought to improve the capabilities of its special- mission aircraft, with a focus
on electronic warfare aircraft, C4ISR platforms, and tankers. China reportedly has
developed jamming versions of several of its larger aircraft, and it may have several
programs under way to deploy new standoff and escort jammers using bombers,
transports, tactical aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). China has been
pursuing an advanced airborne surveillance and control aircraft since the early 1990s. In
1999, it introduced an airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, the Y-8 AEW. Israel’s
cancellation of the more capable PHALCON program in 2001 forced Beijing to pursue
other alternatives, including possible acquisition of the A-50/MAINSTAY AWACS
aircraft from Russia or a domestic program. China began developing its air-to-air
refueling capability in the mid-1980s using a converted B-6/BADGER bomber as an
aerial tanker. PLANAF fighters and tanker aircraft appear to train only on an irregular
basis. China is investing considerably in UAV development. The PLA has a number of
short- and medium- range UAVs in its inventory for reconnaissance, surveillance, and
electronic warfare roles. Research is under way to develop a UAV that eventually will
enable continual surveillance well beyond China’s coastal waters. Air Defense Systems
Much of China’s more recent air defense modernization effort extends from Beijing’s
observation of Western military campaigns beginning with the Gulf War in early 1991.
Employment of precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft, and airborne C4I alerted
Beijing to the limitations of its air defenses. Current Chinese air defense acquisitions are
an effort to address these threats, as well as extend air defense coverage beyond point
defense of major cities and other high- value assets. The design of the domestic HQ-9
surface-to-air missile (SAM) reportedly was influenced by these observations, as were
plans to upgrade China’s C4I system. Modernization is occurring in all services.
Significant developments over the past few years to improve China’s integrated air
defense system include:
· Purchase of advanced Russian SAMs, such as the SA-10 and SA-20, to protect
against a perceived cruise missile threat and to extend air defense coverage against
conventional aircraft.
· Development of an antiradiation SAM, most likely intended to target AWACS
aircraft and standoff jamming platforms.
· Purchase of advanced tactical SAMs for short-range point defense and protection
of ground forces, to include the SA-15 from Russia.
· Development of the LY-60 tactical SAM system for ships and several shoulderfired
SAM systems, such as the QW-1, QW-2, and FN-6, to replace the domestic HN-
5.
· Development of a land-based version of the long-range HQ-9, to precede a naval
version, designed to be a long-range counter to high-performance aircraft, cruise
missiles, ASMs, and tactical ballistic missiles.
The PLAN is addressing its longstanding concerns about its capability to engage enemy
aircraft, cruise missiles, and precision-guided munitions. The problem has become more
pressing as the Navy strives to operate at greater distances from the protection of landbased
air defenses. Currently, PLAN surface combatants have a limited, mainly selfdefense,
antiair warfare capability. Future PLAN air defense improvements include
development of SAMs to provide area defense. This effort has led to continuing
exchanges with Russia on air defense-related radars and missiles. The SA-N-7 provides
the most capable system in the near term. Technology from the SA-N-7 probably could
assist with development of a domestic naval SAM system. In the next decade, the PLAN
could develop a naval missile roughly equivalent to the shore-based SA-10/20s or
purchase them from Russia. Although China prefers domestic SAM development,
whether it will be able to build its own equivalent within an acceptable period is
uncertain. Purchases of additional, more advanced Russian weapons may be required. Conventional Missile Systems
China has an extensive and well-established ballistic missile industrial infrastructure and
has developed and produced a wide variety of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Beijing is concentrating on replacing liquid-propellant missiles with mobile solidpropellant
ones, reflecting concerns about survivability, maintenance, and reliability.
Development of land-attack cruise missiles for both theater and strategic missions is a
high priority, and air-, ground-, and land-based versions of these weapons most likely
will be operational within the next 5 to 10 years. Although China currently produces
several types of land-, sea-, and air- launched cruise missiles, most are short range and for
antiship operations.
All of China’s known SRBM assets are believed to be based in the Nanjing Military
Region opposite Taiwan. China has about 500 SRBMs in its deployed inventory. It is
emphasizing SRBM systems, and the size of the force is likely to increase substantially
over the next few years. The accuracy and lethality of this force also are increasing. The
PLA continues production of the CSS-7 and is developing variants of the CSS-6 that put
Okinawa within range when the missiles are forward-deployed or Taiwan when they are
deployed near garrison. In the future, China will have the option of employing
conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which will extend the
range of its conventional missile strike force.
Nuclear Force Modernization
A ballistic missile modernization program is under way to upgrade all classes of missiles,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Beijing intends this program to improve its nuclear
deterrence by increasing the number of warheads that can target the United States and
augmenting the nuclear force’s operational capabilities for contingencies in East Asia.
China is replacing all of its roughly 20 CSS-4 Mod 1 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) with the longer range CSS-4 Mod 2. Development of the DF-31 ICBM is
progressing, and deployment should begin later this decade. China also is developing two
follow-on extended-range versions of the DF-31: a solid-propellant, mobile ICBM and a
solid-propellant submarine- launched ballistic missile, the JL-2, which will be deployed
on a new ballistic missile submarine by decade’s end. The Second Artillery is continuing
to supplement its aging inventory of liquid-propellant CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles with the solid-propellant, road-mobile CSS-5 MRBM. China currently has about
20 ICBMs capable of targeting the United States. This number could increase to about
30 by 2005 and may reach up to 60 by 2010.
Ground Forces
The focus of Beijing’s ground force modernization is to continue force reductions begun
as early as the mid-1980s. Drawdowns will continue through the next decade and could
reduce PLA forces by 500,000 personnel. The objective of this restructuring is to reduce the costs of supporting a large standing army, improve professionalism, and better equip
and train a smaller force. The most recent and still ongoing round of force reductions
began in 2003 and most likely will be complete by 2005, resulting in a drawdown of
200,000 troops. This reduction will cut a large portion of the logistic force and transfer
nonwarfighter functions to the civilian sector but leave the regular infantry relatively
untouched. One goal of the reduction is to free funds for key units and equipment
acquisitions; however, the size of the PLA ground forces suggests that continued
modernization will remain deliberate and limited through at least 2010. During the next
two decades, mechanized infantry, airborne, armored, and army aviation units will make
up a much larger percentage of the force. In addition, China has recently focused on
increasing the capabilities of reserve and militia units, as well as exploring ways to use
civilian assets, such as ships and aircraft, to support military operations.
With the focus on PLA modernization and restructuring, the recent fielding of new
equipment has been limited and, with some notable exceptions, has not appreciably
improved the capabilities of China’s ground forces. Even with consolidation of ground
force assets into fewer units, the army remains so large as to impede rapid equipment
modernization throughout its force structure. However, new equipment, although not
being deployed throughout the whole of China, is being deployed to the PLA’s
strategically important areas, especially in the southeast.
Equipment modernization within the PLA is focused on deploying more advanced tanks,
upgrading older models, and continuing extensive development of next-generation
models. The PLA has several new or updated armor assets making their way into the
ground force inventory, to include a light tank, an amphibious tank, and an amphibious
armored personnel carrier (APC). Production of the Type 96 tank continues, with about
1,500 expected to be deployed by 2005. The Type 98, the PLA’s most modern tank, is
likely to remain minimally fielded in the next two decades, probably because of
production costs. China also is considering upgrading older Type 69 main battle tanks
with new fire-control systems, engines, turrets, and explosive reactive armor and
designing a next-generation infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) incorporating the upgraded
version of Russian BMP-3 turret technologies (including the fire-control system).
Reportedly, a prototype IFV vehicle is undergoing testing.
Beijing also has ongoing efforts in artillery development and UAV research. The former
emphasizes qualitative improvements to the PLA’s artillery forces over quantitative
production. Progress continues on an advanced multiple rocket launcher and a selfpropelled
amphibious howitzer. Interest in UAVs, mainly reconnaissance versions for
use with the ground forces, underscores the PLA’s requirements to increase
reconnaissance and air defense capabilities. Among the representative models produced
in the past few years are some dual- use versions, such as the W-50 UAV, which can be
employed for missions such as reconnaissance, radio-relay, and electronic jamming.
Another UAV starting to enter the inventory is the ASN-206. Its primary military
applications reportedly are day and night reconnaissance, battlefield surveillance, target
location, artillery fire correction, and battle damage assessment. The PLA has devoted considerable resources to developing special forces, which are an
integral element of China’s ground force. They are expected to play an important role in
achieving objectives in which limited goals, scale of force, and time would be crucial to
victory in a number of military scenarios. Special forces missions most likely include
conducting surveillance and battle damage assessment; locating or destroying C4I assets,
transport nodes, and logistic depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports;
supporting invasion forces; destroying air defenses; and conducting denial and deception
and information operations.
China’s Army Aviation forces provides only minimal support to ground or amphibious
operations despite a growing inventory of helicopters, which currently number about 150-
250. China has acquired a number of Russian Mi-171V5 medium helicopters in the past
few years. Further helicopter deliveries could be planned for the near term. In addition,
production of the Chinese Z-10 armed helicopter is progressing. China still lacks a
heavy- lift and a dedicated attack helicopter. However, whether China feels the need to
fill the heavy- lift gap by acquiring such helicopters remains in question
In addition to procuring new equipment, the PLA is improving the visibility and
management of materiel in its logistics. The main objective of this effort appears to be
directed toward improving fuel management, with several different fuel storage locations
being upgraded with computerized inventory management systems. The inventory
management systems are being networked to provide total asset visibility across military
regions and the country. Much has been written in the last year about fiber-optic logistic
networks. Examples of some recently developed systems are the Army Oil Depot
Information System Platform, Theater POL Supply and Management System, Storehouse
Automated Operations System, Automatic Fuel Transmission System, POL Support
Decisionmaking System, Ammunition Depot Network Automated Support Management
System, and a Video Logistics System. Other key areas being modernized are food and
medical services.
Naval Forces
In recent years, the PLAN’s maritime mission has evolved from a static coastal defense
into an “active offshore defense.” This change in operations requires newer, more
modern warships and submarines capable of operating at greater distances from China’s
coast for longer periods. To meet the challenges of its new defense strategy, China has
active surface combatant, submarine, and amphibious ship construction programs, with
several vessels currently under construction and plans for additional units. One of the top
priorities for the PLAN during the 10th Five-Year Plan is manufacturing submarines.
Where Beijing believes domestic production cannot meet defense needs it has contracted,
mainly with Russia and Ukraine, to purchase weapons and equipment.
As the PLA develops its weapon programs, its force projection capabilities play a central
role in procurement decisionmaking. The complexity of modern warfare has increased in
direct relation to the technological advances in weapon systems. The PLA’s strategy
requires advanced weapon platforms, command and control, and high mobility. China’s technological capabilities lag far behind those of the United States and its allies in East
Asia. An abundance of older Soviet-era equipment poses a significant challenge to the
PLAN’s ability to conduct naval operations and potentially jeopardizes its success. Areas
key to PLAN modernization include antisubmarine warfare (ASW), shipborne antiair
warfare (AAW), and sustained naval operations. The Navy is addressing these concerns
with domestic construction and purchases of state-of-the-art equipment, including
Russian submarines, destroyers, and frigates.
To improve the PLAN’s surface warfare capabilities, China has purchased two
SOVREMENNYY Class destroyers from Russia, with two more on order. These provide
an effective multipurpose ship capable of antiship, AAW, and ASW operations and are
armed with 8 SS-N-22 supersonic antiship cruise missiles, 48 SA-N-7 SAMs, and 1 Ka-
27 ASW helicopter. China is producing a new class of larger, more capable destroyers.
Four units have been launched and are the first Chinese craft to incorporate vertically
launched missile systems, possibly the domestic HQ-9 SAM. By late 2003, construction
of the new-class frigate had accelerated, with production at two shipyards.
China is expanding and upgrading its submarine fleet with the purchase of four Russian
KILO Class attack submarines (SSNs). The KILO is a major improvement for the PLAN
over its noisy ROMEO Class submarines. In addition, the KILO may be armed with
wake-homing torpedoes, which are very difficult to detect. China currently produces two
domestically designed diesel-electric attack submarine classes: the MING and the SONG.
The MING is modeled after the ROMEO, and newer construction units reportedly have
improved sonar and navigation equipment. The SONG is a blend of domestic and
Western technology and has several features that point to a major shift in diesel
submarine design philosophy. China has launched the lead hull of its next-generation
SSN, which is expected to enter service by 2005, with additional units to follow. A newclass
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, similar in design to the SSN, will have
a missile bay to carry a new sea- launched ballistic missile.
Amphibious Forces
The PLA’s amphibious lift assets are insufficient to project force much beyond China’s
shores. Most of the PLA’s landing craft are small and incapable of operating on the open
ocean; its larger landing ships are old and in need of replacement. Since the mid-1990s, a
number of newly designed landing ships have been under construction; however, the
numbers currently believed to be under construction most likely are insufficient to
support a sizable amphibious operation in the next 5 years.
Although the PLA is assessed to lack lift assets for a conventional amphibious assault on
Taiwan, Beijing continues to focus on modernizing and training PLA ground forces that
are believed to have a potential mission against Taiwan. These forces in the Nanjing and
Guangzhou Military Regions have been receiving upgraded amphibious armor and other
vehicles, such as tanks and APCs, and the units acquiring this equipment regularly train
with it. The upgraded amphibious Type 63A tank has a welded turret and rifled 105-mm
tank gun. These tanks also have an image-stabilized fire-control system, satellite
navigation system, and simple thermal imaging system. Type 63As ha ve been fielded to PLA and marine units in southeastern China. Introduction of the WMZ551B, an
upgraded wheeled amphibious APC, to units in the sout heast reportedly will give these
forces improved firepower, maneuverability, and reliability.
PLA military planners recognize that logistic support for an amphibious operation is a
complex and difficult component in campaign planning and ????ution, requiring
coordination between all services and civilian agencies. An amphibious operation would
place great demands on the military and civilian infrastructure. To ensure the success of
such an operation, the PLA has identified a need for comprehensive, focused support.
Logistic support would require providing sufficient transport assets for moving
equipment and supplies to the ports of embarkation, conducting the sea crossing,
supplying adequate ammunition and fuel to conduct operations, and repairing damaged
equipment and facilities.
Space
Acquiring modern ISR systems remains critical to Beijing's military modernization
program and supports the PLA’s local wars doctrine. It also most likely is one of the
primary drivers behind Beijing’s space endeavo rs. Beijing’s ongoing space-based
systems with potential military applications include:
· Two new remote-sensing satellites known as Ziyuan-1 and -2, which is the
Chinese name for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite. Ziyuan-1B has a
resolution of 19 meters and was launched in October 2003. The two Ziyuan-2
satellites probably also are capable of collecting digital imagery and have a sunsynchronous
orbit with worldwide coverage and near-real-time download of imagery
of most of eastern Asia to potential ground sites in eastern and central China. Beijing
also tested a new film-based imagery satellite in late 2003.
· China eventually can be expected to deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance,
and Earth resource systems with military applications. In the next decade, Beijing
most likely will field radar and ocean surveillance satellites and also may deploy an
improved film-based photoreconnaissance satellite. In the interim, China probably
will exploit commercial SPOT, LANDSAT, RADARSAT, Ikonos, and various
Russian satellite imagery systems
· China also is interested in electronic intelligence (ELINT) or signals intelligence
(SIGINT) reconnaissance satellites. Although all of these digital data systems
probably will be able to transmit directly to ground sites, China may be developing a
system of data relay satellites to support global coverage. Furthermore, Beijing has
acquired mobile data reception equipment that could support more rapid data
transmission to deployed military forces and units.
· China is conducting extensive studies and is seeking foreign assistance on small
satellites and has launched a number of them, including a scientific mission satellite,
SJ-5 (Practice-5), in 1999 and an oceanographic research satellite, Haiyang (HY)-1 (Ocean-1), in 2002. At least two additional satellites in this series, HY-2 and -3, are
expected. Other missions for satellites of this class that Beijing eventually may field
include Earth observation, communications, and navigation.
· China also is developing microsatellites--weighing less than 100 kilograms--for
missions that include remote sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar
satellites. A joint venture between China's Tsinghua University and Great Britain’s
University of Surrey is building the “Tsinghua” system, a constellation of seven
minisatellites with 50-meter-resolution remote-sensing payloads. Russia launched the
first satellite in June 2000. Later satellites in the series probably will have improved
resolution.
Counterspace Developments
China is expected to continue to enhance its satellite tracking and identification network.
Beijing’s only current means of destroying or disabling a satellite, however, would be to
launch a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. Such
weapons, however, risk collateral damage to “friendly” space systems. According to
press accounts, China can use probable low-energy lasers to “blind” the sensors on low-
Earth-orbiting satellites, although whether this claim extends to actua l facilities is
unclear.
A Hong Kong newspaper article in January 2001 reported that China had developed and
ground-tested and would soon begin space-testing an antisatellite (ASAT) system
described as a “parasitic microsatellite.” This claim is being eva luated. Nonetheless, a
number of countries, including China, are developing and proliferating microsatellite (10-
to 100-kilogram mass) and nanosatellite (1- to 10-kilogram mass) technologies.
Moreover, China clearly is working on, and plans to field, AS ATs. Additional press
reports and activities at several laser institutes suggest Beijing most likely will continue
to pursue development of ground-based laser ASAT weapons and radars. China's current
level of interest in laser technology suggests that it is reasonable to assume Beijing
eventually could develop a weapon to destroy satellites.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)
China's current leaders have consistently recognized the importance of modernizing the
military's C4I systems. Former Minister of Electronics Industry, former CCP General
Secretary, and current chairman of the Central Military Commission Jiang Zemin has
emphasized that “electronics is of crucial importance to economic construction and
national defense communications.” In summarizing the experiences of the Gulf War after
1991, Jiang Zemin went further, asserting that “military electronics has a bearing on
national security” and “must be given first place.”
To this end, Beijing is continuing development of a joint battle management system that
the entire PLA will use for strategic, campaign, and tactical planning and operations.
Part of this effort is upgrading a previously existing extensive network of hardened underground shelters and command and control facilities for both military and civilian
leaders. Fear of a possible war with the former Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s
prompted Beijing to expend considerable resources constructing national-level command
posts, civil defense facilities, and associated communications. These facilities are
intended to ensure survival of China's leadership and provide a refuge from which it can
maintain control over the country's military forces. Renewed emphasis on improving
these facilities most likely is to improve the chances of leadership survival in modern
warfare.
Both civilian and military communication networks support China’s national command
and control facilities and provide communications to all levels of the military and civilian
leadership. The military communication network provides backbone support to China's
national military command and data network. PLA national-level command, control, and
communications (C3) is carried over multiple transmission systems, to include coaxial
and fiber-optic cable, satellite communications, microwave radio-relay, and long-range
high- frequency radio. China's communication networks, both civil and military, would be
capable of supporting a wide range of military operations.
The General Staff Department Communications Department (Zong canmoubu/tongxin
bu) most likely leads C4I modernization in the PLA. This unit is the PLA’s signal corps,
responsible for building, operating, and protecting the military's communication
infrastructure. In a 1999 article in Chinese Military Science, former Fourth
Subdepartment Director Maj Gen Yuan Banggen identified network building, network
operation, and communication security as the key roles for units under his command.
A critical element of the PLA’s C4I modernization effort is the China Electronic Systems
Engineering Corporation (CESEC), the commercial arm of the General Staff Department
Communications Department. The CESEC is the key to PLA telecommunications, with
interests ranging from mobile communications to secure telephone lines, computer
networks, encryption, microwaves, computer applications, and dedicated military C4I
systems. The CESEC is largely responsible for designing, integrating, and operating the
PLA’s telecommunication and computer networks. It develops software applications and
is closely affiliated with critical General Staff Department research institutes that
specialize in C4I, microwave, and encryption. More important, the CESEC and its
affiliated subsidiaries are also well connected to foreign telecommunication companies,
providing a window for acquiring advanced information security equipment.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Acquisition of modern ISR systems remains a critical aspect of Beijing's military
modernization. China is developing its ISR capabilities based on domestic components,
supplemented by foreign technology acquisition and procurement of complete foreign
systems. PLA procurement of new space systems, AEW aircraft, long-range UAVs, and
over-the- horizon radar will enhance its ability to detect, monitor, and target naval activity
in the western Pacific Ocean. It appears, from writings on PLA exercises, that that this system currently lacks integration and that a fused, efficient ISR capability will not be
achieved for many years.
Exploitatio n of space and acquisition of related technologies remain high priorities in
Beijing’s ISR improvements. China is placing major emphasis on improving space-based
reconnaissance and surveillance, including electro-optical, synthetic-aperture radar, and
other satellite reconnaissance systems. These systems, when fully deployed, are expected
to provide a regional, and potentially hemispheric, continuous surveillance capability.
China has begun to embrace new satellite architecture emphasizing common satellite
buses. This approach to satellite construction is based on use of a standard, versatile
satellite bus module, with minor modifications to accommodate various payloads. In
addition to domestic development, China probably will continue to use commercial
satellite imagery and may seek to join an international consortium-owned constellation.
China is cooperating with a number of countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, to advance its objectives in space.
China’s airborne ISR program has placed significant emphasis on UAVs. China’s armed
forces have operated the Chang Hong (CH-1) long-range, air-launched autonomous
reconnaissance drone since the 1980s. China developed the CH-1 by reverse-engineering
U.S. Firebee reconnaissance drones recovered during the Vietnam War. An upgraded
version of the system was displayed at the 2000 Zhuhai air show and is being offered for
export. A PRC aviation periodical reported that the CH-1 can carry a TV, daylight still, or
infrared camera. It most likely is not equipped with a data link, which would allow
remote-controlled operation, nor is it capable of providing real-time payload feedback to
the remote operator. China’s armed forces also operate other UAVs, primarily for
battlefield reconnaissance or electronic warfare.
China also is pursuing naval ISR programs that include the Y-8 AEW aircraft and efforts
to procure or produce an AWACS. These platforms eventually will complement China’s
other ISR platforms, such as the Tu-154 multirole special mission aircraft equipped for
ELINT collection missions and possibly electronic warfare. The PLAAF reportedly also
has several aircraft–both fighters and bombers–capable of performing an imagery
reconnaissance function. China may have developed passive acoustic sensors for use in
coastal waters and also may have at least one underwater acoustic range. This range
could be used to track torpedoes during training exercises. Because of China's interest in
ASW, development and deployment of additional underwater sensors is probable in the
next 5-10 years and will expand through 2020. Some of these future systems may be
installed as far offshore as the edge of the continental shelf. Passive sensors would
provide only a few miles of coverage against quiet submarines but could detect merchant
shipping and noisy combatants at greater distances.
Ground-based ISR research and development is focused on over-the-horizon radar (OTH)
radar. China may have as many as three OTH skywave radar systems to track maritime
movements in China’s contiguous seas and most likely to serve as part of an effort to
develop the capability to track and target U.S. aircraft carriers. These systems could be used in an early warning capacity. China also may have deployed at least one surfacewave
OTH radar.
Information Operations
China is experiencing a rapid buildup of its information technology capabilities. The
Chinese government effectively uses market access and regulations to force major
foreign information technology companies to transfer technology, share know- how, and,
more recently, open research and development labs in China. Many of the Chinese
companies in these joint ventures are affiliated with state research institutes under the
Ministry of Information Industry or the PLA’s General Staff Department. As a result of
these trends, China is acquiring the personnel and technology bases for a credible
computer network operations capability. However, highly skilled information technology
personnel may seek to avoid government service or cooperation with the government
sector, preferring instead the economic incentives of the private sector. In addition, poor
information technology management skills and a corporate culture that does not
emphasize innovation are hindering development of advanced technology capabilities
and programs.
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) is an important aspect of the PLA’s combat operations and is
viewed as crucial to achieving information dominance in the battlespace. The PLA is
believed to be able to conduct both defensive and offensive EW operations. Basic
objectives of an electronic attack campaign are to conceal PLA operational preparations,
weaken enemy air defense early warning, and paralyze or disrupt enemy integrated air
defense systems. Chinese electronic warfare operational concepts emphasize concealing
the activities and disposition of PLA forces and misleading the enemy. Electronic attack
can deceive or desensitize enemy battle commanders through insertion of spurious radar
tracks or blot out entire avenues of approach.
China’s EW modernization program consists of foreign technology procurement, reverseengineering,
and parallel domestic research and development programs. The Chinese
intend to accelerate modernization through technological leapfrogging. Beijing may
bypass phases of equipment development by purchasing commercial-off-the-shelf
technology. However, China does not want to become reliant on importing EW systems.
Domestic equipment has been manufactured and offered for export, possibly to fund
further research and development. EW research programs reportedly receive high- level
visibility and support from Communist Party senior leaders.
Although the capabilities of most deployed EW equipment are limited by Western
standards, new designs displayed at air and trade shows display marked improvement
over those shown just a few years ago. Furthermore, PLA communication troops
increasingly engage in exercises involving simulated EW attacks against notiona l targets.
Nevertheless, while technology improvements are obvious, even the latest Chinese EW
equipment remains simple by modern standards. Military researchers in the PLA also have repeatedly emphasized that EW and
information warfare are vital for victory in future conflicts. Both military and civilian
sectors play active and important roles in China's military electronics program. In
addition to a range of research and development institutes in all three services of the
PLA, many civilian research organizations, universities, and factories are involved in
projects related to developing electronic equipment for military purposes. The China
Electronic Import and Export Company acts as a window company for the Chinese
military electronic industry to promote its products to foreign countries, with some
notable successes.
V. PRC FORCE MODERNIZATION AND SECURITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Strategies and Options for China’s Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait
China’s recent economic efforts have more than made up for the self-imposed
catastrophes of the Mao era and are diminishing the advantages enjoyed by Taiwan and
its economic successes since the 1960s. Chinese diplomatic pressure has left the island
bereft of allies willing to help defend it from China. Beijing’s military modernization
program is eroding the spatial, temporal, and distance challenges that historically
inhibited using force against Taiwan.
After close to 20 years of spectacular economic growth in China, Beijing’s diplomatic
successes, and steady improvement in the PLA’s military capabilities, the cross-Strait
balance of power is steadily shifting in China’s favor. While continuing to declare its
pursuit of a peaceful unification, Beijing has refused to renounce use of force against
Taiwan and has listed several circumstances under which it would take up arms against
the island. These include a formal declaration of independence by Taipei, foreign
intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs, indefinite delays in resumption of cross-Strait
dialogue, Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and internal unrest on Taiwan. These
statements, and China’s ambitious military modernization program, may reflect an
increasing willingness to consider use of force to achieve unification.
While internal debate over how to respond to Taiwan has ebbed and flowed in recent
years, Beijing still has a political strategy for unification with a military component, not a
military strategy with a political component. Its longstanding approach to resolving the
cross-Strait standoff is multifaceted, integrating political, economic, cultural, and military
strategies to exert all of its national power to dissuade Taiwan against ever crossing any
red lines and ultimately to accept Beijing’s terms. Since Chen’s March 2004 re-election,
Beijing likely has launched an internal debate to assess whether its previous strategy of
isolating him by expanding contacts with political and economic elites on Taiwan – who
traditionally have held more favorable views toward unification – needs to be discarded
in favor of a different mix of political, economic, and diplomatic carrots and sticks.
What does not appear to be in question among China’s senior leaders is their belief in the
need to maintain a credible potential to deliver swift and decisive military force against |
