C4ISR
China’s desire to fight and win “local wars under modern high-tech conditions” requires
a survivable, robust, reliable, and sophisticated C4ISR system to harness battlespace
information and make it available to commanders and civilian decisionmakers.
Communication nodes and intelligence fusion centers are critical at all levels to support
joint operations. The PLA continues to upgrade its communication capabilities, which
eventually will rival the most modern civil networks. Command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) modernization and automation have
been a PLA priority for nearly 25 years. China is steadily improving its C4I capabilities
by leveraging commercial information technologies to advance ambitious plans to create
a high-technology electronic environment capable of supporting a modern military in
both peace and wartime. The PLA is trying to develop a command network capable of
rapidly passing orders and information up and down the chain of command and moving
intelligence to decision makers at the national and war zone levels. China’s development
and deployment of state-of-the-art ISR capabilities are uneven and will further
complicate the PLA’s ability to train in a realistic joint warfare environment and
ultimately to fight a modern battle. Currently targeting is a problem; however, with the
emphasis on space-based imagery and reconnaissance satellites, this lik ely will improve
over the next decade.
Information Operations
The PLA is developing its information operations (IO) capabilities to target and damage
or destroy enemy information systems and weaken the enemy’s command, control, and
overall operational capabilities. Even though these capabilities are improving and the
PLA is conducting IO training, equipment is dated and does not appear to be readily
available to most units. Although current PLA IO systems are older, domestic production,
along with foreign technology transfers, probably will give the PLA access to a wider
range of modern equipment in the future.
The Role of Surprise and Reduction in Warning Time Chinese military writings prescribe use of deception at the campaign level to achieve
maximum surprise and therefore reduce warning time. Campaign deception is military
deception implemented under the unified leadership of campaign commanders to achieve
campaign goals and falls between strategic and tactical deception. This type of deception
can be accomplished through camouflage, feints, and simulation. PLA writings affirm
the belief that a surprise attack can determine the success or failure of a campaign.
However, surprise in an attack cannot ensure the favorable outcome of a war. In the
Chinese view, using surprise attacks to launch a war plays an important role in seizing the
initiative during the initial phase of a conflict. To achieve surprise, a campaign or battle
must meet two basic conditions: “swift action” and “hidden undertakings,” with the latter
the denial and deception measures the Chinese would employ to achieve tactical surprise
on the battlefield.
Training and Exercises
PLA doctrine dictates that training focus on the ability to conduct operations in local
high- intensity, short-duration conflicts. The PLA is meeting its training objectives
through professionalization of its officer and NCO corps, standardization of its training
programs, increased realism of its exercises, and improvements in training facilities.
The PLA has placed significant emphasis on training NCOs and improving its
professional military education (PME) programs to develop a more modern, professional
military force. Following the reduction of compulsory service from 3 to 2 years, the
PLA’s NCO system underwent a major reform, which included efforts to improve
training, recruit soldiers with specialized skills, and improve pay and benefits. The PLA
views improving PME as critical to ensuring it has a professional, properly trained
leadership cadre.
In 2001, the PLA published the Military Training and Examination Program (MTEP).
Developed and implemented along service lines, it provides standardized guidance for all
PLA military training. China is attempting to use this program as a mechanism to
implement a more realistic training program directed toward developing a force capable
of operating in a modern, high-technology combat environment. The MTEP provided a
departure from previous PLA training standards by dictating that tactical training be
tailored to a unit’s specific operational tasks. Although early in its implementation phase,
the MTEP is quite different from previous PLA training norms and could have a
significant effect on developing military skills.
Training facilities and infrastructure have received increased resources. These facilities
and infrastructure include training aids and centers and ranges that offer access to more
realistic training, sometimes through use of simulations and other computer-based
technology. The PLA has emphasized the benefit of being able to ????uate training at
these facilities and encourages commanders to exchange roles for greater exposure to the
other services during training. Access to the more realistic training at these facilities will
become more important in the next several years as the PLA continues to take delivery of
and integrate advanced weapon systems into its inventory. PLA training and exercises have focused increasingly on areas related to modernization,
particularly development of new combat methods, operational experimentation, joint
operations, communications, amphibious operations, and air defense. In recent years the
PLA appears to be trying to improve training realism by stressing adverse conditions,
diverse terrain, and night operations.
Several factors hampered PLA training in 2003. The outbreak of SARS in China
prompted the military to take precautions that most likely were factored into planning and
????ution of PLA training. In late April, a MING submarine accident that killed more
than 70 sailors garnered high- level attention and most likely influenced PLA naval
training and operations.
The PLA has increased its interaction and cooperation with foreign militaries to improve
political and military ties. This activity has taken the form largely of combined exercises
geared toward exposing the PLA to foreign ideas and theories of warfare. An important
example is an August 2003 counterterrorism exercise involving the PLA and five
Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries.
The PLA will continue to focus on improving training standards and realism. Training
concepts and doctrine will evolve, along with experimentation with new tactics and
combat methods. Much of this experimentation and development will come in the areas
of communications, joint operations, and integration of advanced weapons. In the next
year, training probably will become more complex and will place more emphasis on
applying skills rather than increasing basic familiarization. The PLA also will continue
increasing its interaction with foreign militaries. This effort will remain a high priority
for the PLA as it tries to modernize and incorporate warfighting concepts--augmenting its
capability to fight local, high- intensity, short-duration conflicts in a high-technology
environment.
III. RESOURCES FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION
Defense Budget
In March 2004, China announced that a real increase of 11.6 percent ($2.6 billion) to its
2004 defense budget, bringing the total to $25 billion. The 2003-4 defense increase
reflects Beijing’s sustained commitment to PLA modernization. However, the
announced budget markedly understates actual defense-related spending and does not
include major spending categories, such as weapons research and foreign weapon
purchases. In addition, the PLA receives funding or bartered material from a multitude of
sources at every level of government. It also avoids some support costs by using soldiers
to grow food and produce materiel. It even subcontracts soldiers out for public and
private projects. DoD estimated total defense-related expenditures for 2003, counting the
large but difficult-to-calculate off-budget financing, could be between $50 billion and
$70 billion, making China the third largest defense spender in the world, after the United States and Russia, and by far the largest defense spender in Asia followed by Japan.
(figure 1).
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Figure 1. Comparison of Public Budget and Estimated Total Defense-Related
Expenditures
Additional near double-digit budge t increases are likely in the midterm to underwrite
escalating personnel costs, to fund PLA modernization and downsizing, and to offset
funding losses from divested PLA commercial enterprises. However, a lack of detailed
and consistent information makes accurately tracking total defense-related spending
impossible. Furthermore, there is little information, with any confidence, indicating
specific allocations by service or resource category, to include research and development
(R&D), procurement, construction, and personnel.
China’s December 2002 Defense White Paper (the latest version published), despite
official claims that it reflects increased transparency, reveals little about the PLA’s
budget. While Beijing’s White Paper does provide a breakout of the official defense
budget, it does so in poorly defined resource categories, such as personnel expenses (33
percent), maintenance of activities (34 percent), and costs of equipment (32 percent),
which provide little insight into how much funding actually is allocated to each service or
military mission.
Projecting China’s defense spending over a long period is problematic, especially
because total defense spending is not adequately reported or defined. However,
overlaying commercially available estimates of anticipated economic growth with DoD
military spending estimates defines somewhat the boundaries of future defense expenditures. With this method, annual defense spending could increase in real terms
three- four fold by 2025 (figure 2).
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Figure 2. Estimated Chinese Defense Expenditure Projections
Domestic Defense Industry
Overview
Self-sufficiency will continue to be China’s long-term defense industrial goal. Beijing
plans to infuse increasingly advanced technology into the defense industry, hoping to
achieve weapon quality levels approaching those in the industrially developed world
within the next 5 to 10 years. Chinese defense industries have taken near-term steps to
address deficiencies, but Beijing realizes long-term modernization will take time and
entail a variety of measures, to include imports of foreign equipment, technology, and
expertise; cooperative research, development, and production efforts; domestic research
initiatives; and facility expansion and modernization.
Defense Industry Highlights
Beijing has active domestic production programs in all major military- industrial sectors,
and China currently produces a wide variety of military equipment, including missiles,
fighter aircraft, bombers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, tanks, and armored personnel
carriers. However, many programs rely on foreign suppliers for critical components,
such as engines for its fighters, for much of the domestically produced equipment. Also,
China has an extensive and well-established ballistic missile industrial infrastructure and has developed and produced a wide variety of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
China is concentrating on replacing liquid-propellant missiles with mobile solidpropellant
ones, reflecting concerns for survivability, maintenance, and reliability, and is
developing high-priority land-attack cruise missiles for theater and strategic missions. In
addition, China produces several types of land-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles,
mostly for short-range and anti-ship operations.
Beijing continues to pursue a wide variety of domestic military aircraft programs. In
addition to fighter and bomber production, China is developing special purpose aircraft,
including aerial refueling tankers, airborne early warning and collection aircraft, and
electronic countermeasure platforms. While difficulty in producing turbofan engines has
hampered the Chinese aviation industry for years, there are signs of advancement.
Progress has been made on developing the WS10A, the turbofan engine for the F-10--
recent testing reportedly has attained the standard of the Russian AL-31F.
In recent years, the PLAN’s maritime mission has evolved from a static coastal defense
into that of an “active offshore defense.” This change in operations requires newer, more
modern warships and submarines capable of operating out to the Ryukyu Islands and into
the South China Sea. China has active surface combatant, submarine, and amphibious
construction programs, with several vessels currently under constructio n, and plans for
additional units. One of the top priorities for the PLAN during the 10th Five-Year Plan is
manufacture of submarines.
China's ground force modernization focuses on producing more advanced tanks,
upgrading older models, and continuing extensive development efforts on nextgeneration
models. China is designing a next-generation infantry fighting vehicle
incorporating the upgraded version of Russian BMP-3 turret technologies (including the
fire-control system). Reportedly, a prototype vehicle is undergoing testing. China also is
looking into upgrading older Type 69 main battle tanks with new fire-control systems,
engines, turrets, and explosive reactive armor.
Future Trends
The PLA domestic production programs will focus future modernization efforts on
incremental improvements in fire-support, armor, C4ISR, logistics, denial and deception,
and air defense. Developing and fielding new missile, advanced air, and naval systems as
well as fielding ground force equipment, to include self-propelled artillery and air
defense systems, will improve overall capabilities and mobility and survivability on the
battlefield. Fielding and integrating C4ISR systems and fielding satellite communications
at lower echelons will improve the potential for battlespace management among the
services. Improvements in camouflage and use of decoys also will enhance battlefield
survivability.
China’s Access to Foreign Technology and Weapon Systems
Overview China relies heavily on former Soviet Union (FSU) governments for access to modern
weapons, materials, and technical support to achieve strategic goals established under the
10th Five-Year Plan (2001-05) defense modernization program. However, as this
program approaches completion, Beijing may experience proble ms in meeting some of its
modernization goals, with actual deliveries falling about 27 percent in 2003 and new
agreements off by about two-thirds over 2002 levels. China’s arms imports now are
experiencing a moderate decline, which most likely results from a surge in imports in
recent years coupled with the PLA’s difficulty in integrating modern weapons into a
force comprising mostly1960s technology. However, the reduction in deliveries could be
part of a calculated strategy to integrate these new weapons before proceeding with
additional purchases. Historically, China appears to slow defense spending subsequent to
an aggressive buying spree to absorb the influx of new equipment, ensure that all new
products meet its defense needs, validate the functionality of the equipment, secure force
infrastructure integration, and adequately train personnel to operate the new equipment.
FSU Arms Sales and Technology Transfers to China Since 1991
Arms agreements between China and FSU governments since 1991 total $20 billion, with
actual deliveries to date estimated at $12 billion. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus appear to
be China’s chief sources of weapons and materiel, reportedly providing in excess of 95
percent of all China’s arms imports since 1990. Among FSU governments, Russia
clearly is China’s largest arms supplier, accounting for over 90 percent of all FSU arms
sold to China over the past decade. In 2003, China’s primary focus was aerospace
buildup, spending more than $1 billion dollars on 24 Russian advanced fighter aircraft
alone.
The Sino-Russian military trade relationship has been extensive, with China purchasing
advanced Russian weapon systems for its military forces, weapon components for its
domestic production programs, and military technology for its weapon development
programs. Beijing’s purchase of advanced Russian weapon systems available for export
has included Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft; AA-12 air-to-air missiles; SA-10, SA-15,
and SA-20 surface-to-air missiles; 3M-54E Novator Alpha antiship cruise missiles; KILO
submarines; SOVREMENNYY destroyers; and associated weapon systems. China also
relies on key Russian components for several of its weapon production programs and, in
some cases, has purchased production rights to Russian weapon systems. For example,
China assembles Su-27 fighters from Russian kits and eventually is expected to fabricate
major components for the aircraft. In addition to weapon components, Russia continues
to cooperate with China for technical, design, and material support for numerous weapon
and space systems.
Ukraine ranks as the second-largest FSU arms supplier to China; however, signed arms
contracts between Kiev and Beijing total about $300 million, accounting for less than 2
percent of China’s arms purchases during this period. Ukraine’s arms sales to China
reportedly have consisted primarily of weapon system components and equipment to support China’s aircraft and missile programs. For example, Ukraine is reported to have
sold aircraft engines for use on China’s K-8 jet trainer.
While Belarus is not a major arms supplier, Minsk has contracts with Beijing to provide
equipment and technical support. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Minsk
reportedly has signed contracts with Beijing valued at about $225 million, most
earmarked for equipment, technical assistance, and technology to support development of
China’s various missile systems.
Uzbekistan is a minor Chinese arms supplier. Since 1990, Tashkent has signed arms
agreements with Beijing valued at some $100 million, accounting for less than 1 percent
of China’s arms agreements, reportedly involving primarily the sale of the Il-
76/CANDID transport aircraft.
Figure 3. FSU Arms Transfers to China, 1991-2002 (in $ billions). China has signed
arms agreements with FSU states worth about $20 billion and has taken delivery from
these states of about $12 billion in weapons and materiel since 1991.
Drivers in China’s Weapon Acquisition Strategy and Indicators for Future
Cooperation
In addition to maintaining potential suppliers of major weapon systems, modern
electronics, communications, and other advanced technologies for incorporation into its
own weapon programs, Beijing uses arms trade as an avenue to strengthen political
alliances with Russia and its other FSU partners. From 1999 to 2003, Beijing entered
into several major new weapon negotiations with Moscow, suggesting China will
continue to rely on Russia as its primary source of modern military weapons and
advanced technology.
China pursues a two-track weapon acquisition strategy to satisfy both long- and shortterm
military requirements; Russia figures prominently in both tracks. In the first track,
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Agreements
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